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1 Introduction
Behavioral and experimental economics has over the past decades provided a host of
insights about the motivations that drive human behavior in social dilemmas. Notwith-
standing the wealth of preference classes that have been considered—notably, altruism
(Becker, 1974), warm glow (Andreoni, 1990), inequity aversion (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999;
Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000), reciprocity (Rabin, 1993; Charness & Rabin, 2002; Dufwen-
berg & Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk & Fischbacher, 2006), guilt aversion (Charness & Dufwen-
berg, 2006; Battigalli & Dufwenberg, 2007), and image concerns (Bénabou & Tirole, 2006;
Ellingsen & Johannesson, 2008)—recent theoretical work has shown that yet another type
of preferences is strongly favored by evolutionary forces. The novel element is a form of
Kantian moral concern, so called Homo moralis preferences (Alger & Weibull, 2013; Al-
ger, Weibull, & Lehmann, 2020). The Kantian moral concern induces the individual to
evaluate each course of action in the light of what material payoff (s)he would achieve,
should others choose the same course of action. The purpose of this paper is to examine
the explanatory power of such Kantian moral concerns, when these are assumed to be at
work alongside consequentialistic concerns such as altruism and inequity aversion. We
do this by way of conducting an experimental study.
The laboratory experiment consists of letting each subject choose strategies in three
classes of two-player social dilemmas: sequential prisoners’ dilemmas, mini trust games,
and mini ultimatum bargaining games. In such sequential games one subject moves be-
fore the other, and it is this feature that allows us to distinguish consequentialistic mo-
tives from Kantian morality (à la Homo moralis, Alger & Weibull, 2013). Indeed, since
each subject is told that he stands an equal chance of being a first- and a second-mover,
Kantian morality would make him attach some value to the material payoff he would
obtain if he played against himself. By contrast, a subject with purely consequentialistic
preferences would make the subject attach value solely to the material payoff distribution
that he expects to realize, given his beliefs about the opponent’s strategy.1
1It is well known that the ability to control for subjects’ beliefs when trying to identify their preferences
is important (Bellemare et al., 2008; Miettinen et al., 2020). This is particularly true here, for Kantian
morality reduces the sensitivity to beliefs. In the extreme case of an individual who would be driven
entirely by the Kantian moral concern, the beliefs about the opponent’s strategy would indeed be irrelevant,
for such an individual would simply choose the “right thing to do.” Hence, information about subjects’
beliefs is crucial to distinguish Kantian moral concerns from consequentialistic ones. Accordingly, instead
of hypothesizing subjects’ beliefs about the behavior of their opponents (for example by some equilibrium
hypothesis), we elicit each subject’s belief in each strategic interaction. In further robustness checks, we
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Positing a utility function with three parameters capturing attitudes towards unfavor-
able inequity, favorable inequity, and the Kantian moral concern, we use the observed in-
dividual choices and reported beliefs in 18 different games (six games in each game class)
to structurally estimate the preference parameter values for each individual subject, us-
ing a standard random utility model.2 The use of such structural models has become
more commonplace in experimental and behavioral economics, including the estimation
of social preferences (DellaVigna, 2018). We also perform aggregate estimations, using
a finite mixture approach, the same as that used by Bruhin, Fehr, and Schunk (2019) in
their statistical analysis of social preferences.3
Not surprisingly, the estimations at the level of the individual subjects reveal a lot of
heterogeneity in preferences. While many subjects appear to be averse to unfavorable
inequity, some appear to be either indifferent or either like or dislike favorable inequity.
The behavior of most subjects is compatible with some concern for Kantian morality, and
allowing for this motivational factor significantly improves the fit of the model to the
data. Kantian morality further appears in all the aggregate estimations. The represen-
tative agent in the subject pool combines “behindness aversion” with Kantian morality.4
Models with two or three types provide a much better fit than the representative agent
model. Our finite mixture estimations thus capture the heterogeneity in a tractable way.
The two-types model has one type that combines inequity aversion with Kantian moral-
ity, while the other type combines “spite” or “competitiveness” – an aversion to being
behind and taste for being ahead – with Kantian morality.
Importantly, allowing for Kantian morality substantially improves the fit of the model.
Model selection criteria and out-of-sample predictions indeed favor models with Kantian
morality over those without. Comparing our main estimates to those based on a utility
function with negative reciprocity as in Charness and Rabin (2002) instead of the Kantian
moral concern further shows that the value added of Kantian morality is in the same
ballpark as such well-established motives as inequity aversion, altruism, and reciprocity.
Moreover, the out-of-sample predictions are more accurate with preferences that combine
also impose rational expectations instead.
2Social image concerns (Bénabou & Tirole, 2006) are muted because subjects are anonymously and ran-
domly matched.
3See also Bardsley and Moffatt (2007), Iriberri and Rey-Biel (2013) and Breitmoser (2013), who use
related mixture models to capture heterogeneity in social preferences.
4Interestingly, this is in line with the theoretical prediction of Alger et al. (2020), who show in a general
model that preferences that combine material self-interest, a Kantian moral concern and other-regard at
the material payoff level is what should be expected in most human populations.
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Kantian morality with attitudes towards the realized payoff distribution, than any of the
preferences without the Kantian moral concern.
Our paper fits in the large literature that estimates or tests models of social prefer-
ences.5 In relation to this literature, our main contribution is that we allow for the possi-
bility of Kantian morality as part of the motivation behind subjects’ choices, in addition
to social preferences. Closest to our work is the paper by Miettinen et al. (2020), who also
allow for this possibility.6 Our study is similar to theirs in two respects. First, both experi-
ments rely on sequential games (our experimental design was indeed inspired by theirs in
this respect). Second, in both experiments the subjects’ beliefs about opponents’ choices
are elicited and used as controls in the empirical estimations. The key difference between
ours and their study is that our data set is much richer: we collect data on individual
choices in 18 strategic interactions while in their study each subject faces one single se-
quential prisoners’ dilemma. Our rich data set gives us access to a rich set of empirical
tools. In particular, while Miettinen et al. (2020) compare the explanatory power of six
alternative utility functions, which involve either a consequentialistic, a reciprocity, or a
Kantian concern, our data set allows us to estimate preference parameters at the individ-
ual level, and to apply finite mixture methods in order to detect the presence of common
preference types that combine social preferences and Kantian morality. As indicated by
our results, most subjects indeed appear to have such complex preferences. Furthermore,
our data enables use of out-of-sample predictions to evaluate the explanatory power of
the estimated preference types.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the experi-
mental design and introduces the class of preferences we estimate, and Section 3 presents
our econometric approach. The results are presented in Section 4, wherein we also report
robustness checks and several measures of the value added of Kantian morality in our
experiment. Section 5 concludes.
5See, for example, Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997); Andreoni and Miller (2002); Charness and Rabin (2002);
Engelmann and Strobel (2004); Bardsley and Moffatt (2007); Fisman, Kariv, and Markovits (2007); Belle-
mare et al. (2008); Blanco, Engelmann, and Normann (2011); DellaVigna, List, and Malmendier (2012);
Breitmoser (2013); Iriberri and Rey-Biel (2013); Ottoni-Wilhelm, Vesterlund, and Xie (2017) and, for a re-
cent survey, see Cooper and Kagel (2015). Closest to our work is the recent study by Bruhin et al. (2019),
who use the same finite mixture approach as we do, but who do not consider Kantian morality.
6See also Capraro and Rand (2018), who evaluate the explanatory power of Homo moralis preferences
in standard games; however, and by contrast to our experiment and that by Miettinen et al. (2020), they
rely on framing. More generally, economists are increasingly seeking to evaluate the explanatory power of
non-consequentialistic motives; see, e.g., Bénabou, Falk, Henkel, and Tirole (2020).
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2 The experiment: game protocols, preferences, and pro-
cedures
2.1 Game protocols
In the experiment, subjects play three types of well-known game protocols, illustrated in
Figure 1: the Sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma protocol (SPD), shown in Figure 1a, the mini
Trust Game protocol (TG), shown in Figure 1b, and the mini Ultimatum Game protocol
(UG), shown in Figure 1c.7 We use the standard notation for prisoners’ dilemmas, where
R stands for “reward”, S for “sucker’s payoff”, T for “temptation”, and P for “punish-
ment”, and we throughout assume T > R > P > S.
The objective of the experiment is to test whether Kantian morality (à la Homo moralis,
Alger & Weibull, 2013) can help explain the choices subjects make in these game proto-
cols. A subject with such Kantian morality evaluates each strategy in the light of what
his/her material payoff would be if, hypothetically, the opponent were to choose the same
strategy. This requires that the interaction is symmetric. To symmetrize the game proto-
cols in Figure 1—which are asymmetric with one first-mover and one second-mover—we
make it clear to the subjects that they are equally likely to be drawn to play in each player
role. This defines a symmetric (meta) game protocol, in which “nature” first draws the
role assignment, with equal probability for both assignments, and then the players learn
their respective roles. The game tree corresponding to this game protocol for the SPD is
shown in Figure 2. A behavior strategy consists of specifying (potentially randomized)
choices at all decision nodes in this game protocol. Let x = (x1,x2,x3) denote the behavior
strategy of subject i in this game tree: x1 is the probability that i plays C as a first mover,
x2 the probability that i plays C as a second mover following play C by the opponent, and
x3 the probability that i plays C as a second mover following play D by the opponent.
Likewise, let y = (y1, y2, y3) denote the behavior strategy used by the opponent (subject
j). Each strategy pair (x,y) determines the realization probability η(x,y) (γ) of each play γ
of the game protocol, where a play is a sequence of moves through the game tree, from






Turning to the two other game protocols, when the trust game protocol is symmet-
rically randomized, a behavior strategy is a vector, x = (x1,x2) ∈ [0,1]2, where x1 is the
7By a “game protocol”, we mean a game tree and associated monetary payoffs.
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(c) Ultimatum Game protocol
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probability with which i invests (selects (I)) and x2 the probability with which i gives
back something (selects G) if the first-mover invested. When the ultimatum game pro-
tocol is symmetrically randomized, a behavior strategy is a vector, x = (x1,x2) ∈ [0,1]2,
where x1 is the probability with which i proposes an equal sharing (selects (E)), and x2
the probability with which i accepts an unequal sharing (selects (A)). Like in the SPD
game protocol, for both the TG and the UG protocols we denote by y = (y1, y2) the strat-
egy of i’s opponent j, and write η(x,y) (γ) to denote the probability of each play γ of the
game protocol at hand.
Having formally defined the game protocols, we are in a position to define the utility
function that we posit.
2.2 Social preferences and Kantian morality
Let the expected utility of a subject i playing against a subject j be
ui (x,y) = (1−κi) ·
∑
γ


















η(x,x) (γ) ·πi (γ) ,
where x and y are i’s and j’s behavior strategy, respectively, πi is i’s material utility follow-
ing play γ and πij is j’s material utility following play γ . This utility function has three
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parameters. Two of them are the familiar measures of inequity aversion. The parameter
αi captures i’s disutility (if αi > 0) or utility (if αi < 0) from disadvantageous inequity, i.e.,
from falling short in terms of material utility in the interaction. Likewise, the parame-
ter βi captures i’s disutility (if βi > 0) or utility (if βi < 0) from advantageous inequity,
i.e., from being ahead in terms of material utility. The third parameter, κi , captures a
Kantian moral concern (à la Homo moralis, Alger & Weibull, 2013). It places weight on
the expected material utility that the subject would obtain if, hypothetically, both indi-
viduals were to use the subject’s strategy x. Under this hypothesis, the probability that
a play γ would occur is η(x,x) (γ). A κi-value strictly between zero and one represents a
partly deontological motivation, an individual who, in addition to the social concern that
consists in caring about his or her own material utility and that to the other individual in
the interaction, is also motivated by what is the “right thing to do”, what strategy to use
if it were also used by the opponent. To choose a strategy x in order to maximize the last
term in (1) is to choose a strategy that maximizes material utility if used by both subjects
(see Alger & Weibull, 2013, for a discussion).
The utility function in (1) nests many familiar utility functions in the literature. Clearly,
setting all three parameters to zero, αi = βi = κi = 0, represents pure self-interest and thus
amounts to the classical Homo oeconomicus. The Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model of in-
equity aversion is obtained by setting αi ≥ βi > 0 and κi = 0. One obtains Becker’s (1974)
model of pure altruism by setting κi = 0 and αi = −βi , for some βi ∈ (0,1).8 Here βi is the
individual’s “degree of altruism”, the weight placed on the other subject’s material utility,
while the weight 1− βi is placed on own material utility. Pure Homo moralis preferences
are obtained by setting αi = βi = 0 and κi ∈ (0,1). Here κi is the individual’s “degree of
Kantian morality”, the weight placed on the material utility that would be obtained if
both subjects in the interaction at hand played x, the strategy used by individual i, while
the weight 1 − κi is placed on own material utility, given the strategy profile (x,y) effec-
tively played. The utility function in (1) also nests the Charness and Rabin (2002) model
without reciprocity. In Section 4.4 we extend the utility function to also accommodate
reciprocity as formalized in Charness and Rabin (2002).
Because each subject in our experiment faces risky decisions (the monetary payoff
depends on the decision of the opponent, which the subject does not know when making
the decisions), we allow for risk aversion. Thus, the term πi (γ) in equation (1) is the
Bernoulli function value that the individual attaches to his or her monetary payoff under
8See also the note by Engelmann (2012) on extending inequity aversion models to incorporate altruism.
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play γ . We will call πi (γ) the individual’s material utility under play γ . If the monetary
payoff allocation after a play γ is
(
mi (γ) ,mj (γ)
)
, we assume that the individual’s own






where ri is the (constant) degree of relative risk aversion of subject i. We further assume
that each subject evaluates his or her opponent’s monetary payoff in terms of own risk






Risk neutrality is the special case when ri = 0, and we identify the special case ri = 1 with
logarithmic utility for money: then πi (γ) = lnmi (γ) and πij (γ) = lnmj (γ).
2.3 Distinguishing Kantian morality from social preferences
Many experimental studies use dictator game protocols to estimate social preferences.
An advantage of such protocols is that they contain no strategic element, and hence there
is no need to elicit subjects’ beliefs about other subjects’ behaviors. However, this class of
game protocols would not allow us to distinguish between social preferences and Kantian
morality à la Homo moralis. To see why, consider a dictator game in which the donor may
transfer any part of his endowment w to the recipient, and the amount transferred will be
multiplied by a factorm > 1. Suppose that both players face an equal probability of being
the donor, and denote by x ∈ [0,w] and y ∈ [0,w] their respective strategies (how much to
give in the donor role). Consider first a risk-neutral pure altruist i, with βi = −αi ≥ κi = 0,




[(1− βi)(w − x+my) + βi(mx+w − y)] . (4)





[(1−κi)(w − x+my) +κi(mx+w − x)] . (5)
9There is experimental evidence that both students and financial professionals exhibit such false consen-
sus (Roth & Voskort, 2014). Moreover, there is experimental evidence that people make the same decisions
under risk (in the gain domain) for themselves and others (Andersson, Holm, Tyran, & Wengström, 2014).
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Comparison of the second terms in these utility functions reveals that while an altruist
cares about the other individual’s monetary payoff (mx + w − y)/2 (which depends on
the other’s strategy y), an individual driven by Kantian morality instead cares about the
monetary payoff (mx+w−x)/2, which would result if both players were to use i’s strategy
x. Nonetheless, as shown by the derivatives with respect to own strategy x, the trade-off













(κim− 1) . (7)
Whether an altruist or a Kantian moralist, the individual either gives the whole endow-
ment or nothing at all: indeed, dividing the right-hand side of (6) by 1 − βi , and letting
σi ≡
βi
1−βi , we see that the altruist gives everything if σi exceeds 1/m while the Kantian
moralist gives everything if κi exceeds 1/m.10 Therefore, we would be unable to separate
altruism from a Kantian concern using dictator games.11
By instead using game protocols that contain strategic elements and collecting data on
decisions at all nodes in the game tree as well as beliefs about opponent’s play, our exper-
imental design allows us to discriminate between social and Kantian moral preferences.
The key effect is that an individual with a Kantian moral concern is not only influenced by
his belief about the opponent’s actual play, but also by what he would himself have done
had the player roles been reversed (information that we collect in the experiment). Put
differently, an important consequence of Kantian morality is that a subject’s preferences
over moves off the equilibrium path associated with a strategy pair (x,y) may influence
his or her decisions on its path. This differs sharply from altruism, inequity aversion or
spite, which induce consequentialistic reasoning.
10This observation is in line with a more general comparison of behavioral predictions for altruists and
Kantian moralists in Alger and Weibull (2013), see also Alger and Weibull (2017).
11We would face the same identification problem with allocation tasks. Consider a subject i who faces
the choice between the allocations (S,T ) and (P ,P ), where the first entry is monetary payoff to self and the
second entry is monetary payoff to the other subject, with T > P > S. A risk-neutral subject i with a utility
function of the form in (1) strictly prefers (S,T ) to (P ,P ) if and only if κi(T − P )−αi(T − S) > P − S. Hence,
a subject who selects (S,T ) can be driven either by pure altruism (−αi > 0 = κi), by pure Kantian morality
(κi > 0 = αi), by a combination of these, or by a combination of behindness aversion and Kantian morality
(αi ·κi > 0).
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Concretely, consider first a (symmetrically randomized) Trust Game protocol (see Fig-
ure 1b) with 2R > T + S, and suppose that an individual i believes that the opponent
will play K (“keep”) as second-mover. If this individual i has no Kantian morality and is
either selfish or driven by behindness aversion (αi > 0), he will choose N (“not invest”)
as first-mover. By contrast, if he has Kantian morality of a sufficiently large degree κi ,
then he will, as first-mover, choose I (“invest”), because he would himself play G (“give
back”) as second mover. Likewise, in the (symmetrically randomized) Sequential Pris-
oner’s Dilemma protocol (Figure 1a), suppose that 2R > T +S > 2P and consider a subject
who believes that the other will choose D both as first-mover and as second-mover. De-
spite this belief, a subject i with a large enough degree of Kantian morality would never-
theless evaluate the play C followed by C, because this is the play he would choose if he
met himself.
Turning finally to the Ultimatum Game protocol, as in Figure 1c, we use it to conduct
a formal analysis of the effect of Kantian morality (a formal analysis of the other two
game protocols is provided in Appendix A1). A risk-neutral subject i obtains the follow-
ing expected utility from using behavior strategy x = (x1,x2) when he believes that the
opponent will use behavior strategy ŷ = (ŷ1, ŷ2) (the randomization factor 1/2 has been
omitted):
ui (x, ŷ) = (1−κi)[x1R+ (1− x1) ŷ2T + (1− x1) (1− ŷ2)S (8)
+ ŷ1R+ (1− ŷ1)x2P + (1− ŷ1) (1− x2)S]
− [αi (1− ŷ1)x2 + βi (1− x1) ŷ2] (T − P )
+κi[x1R+ (1− x1)x2T + (1− x1) (1− x2)S
+ x1R+ (1− x1)x2P + (1− x1) (1− x2)S].
The partial derivatives with respect to x1 and x2 are thus:
∂ui (x, ŷ)
∂x1
= (1−κi)[R− ŷ2T − (1− ŷ2)S] + βi · ŷ2 (T − P ) (9)
+κi · [2(R− S)− x2 (T + P − 2S)]
∂ui (x, ŷ)
∂x2
= (1−κi) (1− ŷ1) (P − S)−αi · (1− ŷ1) (T − P ) +κi · (1− x1) (T + P − 2S) . (10)
To see the two key effects of Kantian morality mentioned above, we compare an individ-
ual who is inequity averse but does not have a Kantian concern (κi = 0) to one who has
a Kantian concern but is not inequity averse (αi = βi = 0). First, when considering the
effect of his choice as a first-mover, x1, the inequity-averse individual pays no attention
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to his choice as a second-mover, while the Kantian moralist does (i.e., x2 shows up in the
derivative if and only if κi , 0). Likewise, when considering the effect of his choice as
a second-mover, x2, the inequity-averse individual pays no attention to his choice as a
first-mover, while the Kantian moralist does (i.e., x1 shows up in (10) if κi , 0). Second,
the expressions (9) and (10) show that beliefs about the opponent’s play (information
that we elicit from the subjects) matter less for a pure Kantian moralist than for a purely
inequity averse individual. In the extreme case where κ = 1 > α = β = 0, the Kantian
moralist chooses the strategy that would maximize the expected material payoff should
both players choose it, irrespective of what (s)he believes the opponent will play.
Clearly, disentangling an individual’s social preferences from his or her Kantian moral
preferences requires controlling for his or her beliefs about the opponent’s play. We there-
fore elicit subjects’ such beliefs (by way of the quadratic scoring rule). We describe the
experimental procedures, including the belief elicitation procedure, in the next subsec-
tion.
2.4 Procedures
In total, 136 subjects (69 men, 67 women) participated in the experiment. We conducted
8 sessions at the CentERlab of Tilburg University, with between 12 and 22 subjects per
session. Using the strategy method, each subject made decisions both as a first mover and
a second mover for 18 game protocols (6 SPDs, 6 TGs and 6 UGs), for different monetary
payoff assignments T , R, P and S, listed in Table 1.12
All payoffs are denoted in ‘points’, where one point is equivalent to 17 eurocents. The
order of the game protocols was randomly determined at the beginning of each session.
For each game protocol, subjects first indicated what they would do at each decision node
and second what they believed others would do at each decision node. In all game pro-
tocols, we used neutral labels. Two of the 18 game protocols were randomly selected for
payment. For one game protocol, subjects were paid based on their actions and for the
second game protocol they were paid based on the accuracy of their beliefs. For the pay-
ment based on actions, subjects were randomly matched in pairs and randomly assigned
the role of first-mover or second-mover. Based on the actions in a pair, earnings for both
subjects in the pair were calculated. For the payment based on beliefs, one decision node
was randomly selected and subjects were paid using a quadratic scoring rule.
12In the process of selecting the number of game protocols and the monetary payoffs, we conducted
simulations to verify if we could retrieve the original parameters.
12
Table 1: Game protocols: monetary payoffs, actions and beliefs
No. T R P S x1 x2 x3 y1 y2 y3
Sequential Prisoner’s Dilemmas
1 90 45 15 10 0.18 0.15 0.10 0.33 0.20 0.13
2 90 55 20 10 0.24 0.20 0.06 0.30 0.21 0.07
3 80 65 25 20 0.35 0.29 0.13 0.32 0.30 0.16
4 90 65 25 10 0.29 0.31 0.03 0.31 0.25 0.08
5 80 75 30 20 0.43 0.50 0.04 0.40 0.41 0.11
6 90 75 30 10 0.30 0.40 0.01 0.33 0.33 0.08
All SPDs 0.30 0.31 0.06 0.33 0.28 0.11
Trust Games
7 80 50 30 20 0.44 0.27 . 0.41 0.23 .
8 90 50 30 10 0.18 0.18 . 0.33 0.19 .
9 80 60 30 20 0.56 0.35 . 0.47 0.30 .
10 90 60 30 10 0.35 0.25 . 0.37 0.24 .
11 80 70 30 20 0.62 0.51 . 0.54 0.42 .
12 90 70 30 10 0.46 0.40 . 0.42 0.31 .
All TGs 0.44 0.33 . 0.42 0.28 .
Ultimatum Games
13 60 50 40 10 0.49 0.96 . 0.48 0.91 .
14 65 50 35 10 0.52 0.96 . 0.49 0.88 .
15 70 50 30 10 0.46 0.96 . 0.47 0.87 .
16 75 50 25 10 0.43 0.90 . 0.47 0.83 .
17 80 50 20 10 0.60 0.88 . 0.51 0.79 .
18 85 50 15 10 0.60 0.81 . 0.55 0.72 .
All UGs 0.51 0.91 . 0.50 0.83 .
Notes: Here x1, x2 and x3 denote action frequencies. In the SPDs, x1 is the fre-
quency by which the first mover plays C, x2 the frequency by which the second
mover plays C after C, and x3 the frequency by which she plays C afterD. In the
TGs, x1 is the frequency by which the first mover plays I , and x2 the frequency
by which the second mover plays G after I . For the UGs, x1 is the frequency by
which the first mover plays E, and x2 the frequency by which the second mover
plays A after U . Likewise, y1, y2 and y3 are the mean values of the stated beliefs
about x1, x2 and x3. Table based on all 136 subjects.
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At the beginning of each session, subjects were randomly assigned a cubicle and read
the instructions on-screen at their own pace. Subjects also received a printed summary
of the instructions. At the end of the instructions subjects had to successfully complete
a quiz to test their understanding of the instructions before they could continue. After
completing the game protocols, we elicited risk attitudes using an incentivized method
similar to the method of Eckel and Grossman (2002). Self-reported demographic data
was gathered by way of asking the subjects to complete a short questionnaire at the end
of the session. The instructions, quiz questions and risk elicitation task are reproduced
in Appendix A4. Sessions took around 1 hour and subjects earned between e10.50 and
e26.90 with an average of e18.80. Key features of the experimental design and main
analyses were pre-registered.13
Prior to describing how we will analyze the data, we present some descriptive statis-
tics.
2.5 Descriptive statistics
In Table 1, we present an overview of the average actions and beliefs for each game pro-
tocol. On average, observed behavior follows patterns that accord well with other exper-
iments. For example, in the SPDs, on average subjects display conditional cooperation
(x2 > x3). In the TGs, increasing the temptation payoff T and decreasing the sucker payoff
S (compare game protocols 7 vs 8, 9 vs 10, 11 vs 12) reduces both trust (x1) and trustwor-
thiness (x2). In the UGs, lower offers (P ) are accepted less frequently (x2). Moreover, on
average actions (x) and beliefs (y) are highly correlated (see also Figure A.1 in Appendix
A3). Table A.2 in Appendix A3 presents all decisions in the risk elicitation task. Based
on their lottery choice, most subjects (83%) are classified as being risk-averse.
3 Statistical analysis
The econometric strategy consists in producing both individual and aggregate estimates
of the parameters in the utility function specified in (1) using a random utility model. In
the main specification we control for the subjects’ stated beliefs (note that this implies
that no equilibrium assumption is needed). We will then conduct several robustness




For each subject i, we estimate the individual’s social and moral preference parameters
αi , βi , and κi as specified in (1), using a standard additive error specification. We refer
to these preference parameters using the vector θi = (αi ,βi ,κi). For each individual, we
infer the risk parameter ri from the lottery choices in the Eckel and Grossman (2002)
task (see Table A.2 in Appendix A3). As robustness checks, we also estimate ri alongside
the other parameters and we carry out the analysis under the alternative assumption
that all subjects are risk neutral (all ri = 0), see Section 4.3. We consider pure strategies
(that is, assigning a unique action at each decision node), and assume that subject i’s
true (expected) utility from using pure strategy xi when ŷi is i’s expectation about his
opponents behavior, is a random variable of the additive form
ũi(xi , ŷi ,θi) = ui(xi , ŷi ,θi) + εixi ,
where ui(xi , ŷi ,θi) is the expected utility of using strategy xi given beliefs ŷi following
from the utility function in (1), and εixi is a random variable representing idiosyncratic
tastes not picked up by the hypothesized utility ui(xi , ŷi ,θi). Such a random utility speci-
fication sometimes induces choice of actions that do not maximize the deterministic com-
ponent ui(xi , ŷi ,θi). Assuming that the noise terms εixi are statistically independent (be-
tween subjects and across pure behavior strategies xi for each subject) and Gumbel dis-
tributed with the same variance, the probability that subject i will use strategy xi , given
his probabilistic belief ŷi about the opponent’s play is given by the familiar logit formula
(McFadden, 1974):
pi (xi , ŷi ,θi ,λi) =
exp[(ui(xi , ŷi ,θi)) /λi]∑
x′∈Xg exp[(ui(x
′, ŷi ,θi)) /λi]
, (11)
where λi > 0 is a “noise” parameter, which is estimated alongside the preference param-
eters in θi , and Xg denotes the set of pure strategies in game protocol g ∈ G, where G is
the set of game protocols. The smaller the parameter λi is, the higher is the probability
that individual i makes his or her choices according to the hypothesized utility function
ui(xi , ŷi ,θi). We use maximum likelihood to estimate the preference parameter vector
θi = (αi ,βi ,κi) and the “noise” parameter λi for each individual i.14 Then, the probability
14In the maximum likelihood estimations, we use 7 different starting values for each parameter, so 74 =
2,401 starting values per individual i.
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density function can be written as:





pi (x, ŷi ,θi ,λi)
I(i,g,x) , (12)
where xi is the vector of the observed pure strategies of individual i, ŷi is the vector of
stated beliefs of individual i about opponent’s strategy in all the game protocols, and
I(i,g,x) is an indicator function that equals 1 if i played strategy x in game protocol g and
0 otherwise.
3.2 Aggregate estimations
We estimate preference parameters both for a representative agent and a given number
of “preference types”. For the representative agent, we simply aggregate all individual
decisions and treat them as if they come from a single decision-maker. For the types
estimations, we use finite mixture models, similar to the approach used by Bruhin et al.
(2019). The finite mixture estimations allow us to capture heterogeneity in the population
in a tractable way. For these estimations, we assume that there is a given number of
types K in the population. For each type k = {1, ...,K}, we estimate the parameter vector
θk = (αk ,βk ,κk) and the noise parameter λk.
In a recent paper, Apesteguia and Ballester (2018) show that estimating CRRA pa-
rameters using a random utility model may be problematic. To avoid this, we estimate
the social preference and Kantian morality parameters under the assumption that all
subjects have logarithmic utility over monetary outcomes (i.e. we impose rk = 1 for all
types k). Given that most subjects in our experiment are risk averse according to the lot-
tery task, assuming homogeneous risk aversion seems a better approximation of the data
than assuming homogeneous risk neutrality. In subsection 4.3 we relax this assumption
and also run estimations where we estimate the CRRA parameter rk alongside the social
preference and morality parameters. As an additional robustness check, we also run the
estimations imposing risk-neutrality (i.e. rk = 0 for all types k).







φk · f (xi , ŷi ,θk ,λk)
 , (13)
where φk is the population share of type k in the population. To maximize the log-
likelihood in (13), we use an Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm (see for instance
16
McLachlan, Lee, & Rathnayake, 2019).15 As part of the EM algorithm, we estimate the
posterior probabilities τi,k that individual i belongs to type k by:
τi,k =
φk · f (xi , ŷi ,θk ,λk)∑K




Figure 3 shows the marginal distributions of the estimated individual preference param-
eters αi , βi , and κi .16 For all three parameters, we observe considerable heterogeneity.
Most estimates of αi and κi are positive and signed-ranks tests confirm that the parame-
ter distributions are located to the right of zero (p < 0.001 for both αi and κi estimates).
By contrast, most estimates of βi are negative, and this is again confirmed by a signed-
rank test (p = 0.003). Hence, we find that most subjects are motivated by a combination
of Kantian morality (κi > 0) and spite (αi > 0,βi < 0).
Table 2, which shows summary statistics for the parameter estimates, provides further
support for the pattern observed in Figure 3. Median and mean estimates are positive for
αi and κi , but negative for βi . Moreover, the relatively large standard deviations indicate
that there is considerable heterogeneity in social preferences and Kantian morality.17
Figure 4 illustrates the pairwise correlations between the three preference parameter
estimates. The left panel of Figure 4 shows that the estimates for αi and βi are negatively
correlated (Spearman’s ρ = −0.295, p = 0.002, n = 109), and again that there is substantial
heterogeneity. For many individuals we observe a combination of αi > 0 and βi < 0,
15We use 24 sets of starting values.
16In the estimations, we do not restrict the size or the sign of the parameter estimates. For most subjects,
the parameter estimates are of reasonable size. However, for some subjects we obtain very large estimates
of αi , βi , and/or κi (in absolute value), suggesting that our utility function (1) does not explain the decisions
of these subjects well, either because they use a decision rule not nested in (1), or because their decisions
are simply too noisy to be generated by any utility function. In the remainder of this section, we report
results for our ‘core sample’, which consists of the 109 subjects for whom all three preference parameter
estimates lie between -2 and 2. The fraction that we leave out in the main text (19,6%) is comparable in
size to the fraction of 26.3% for whom Fisman et al. (2007) conclude that their decisions are too noisy to
be utility-generated. In Appendix A3 we report results based on data for all 136 subjects. While the latter
results are more noisy, they are qualitatively quite similar to those for the core sample.
17For these estimates we used the risk elicitation task to determine ri . In subsection 4.3 we provide
robustness tests where we estimate ri alongside the preference parameter, or impose risk neutrality.
17
































-2 -1.6 -1.2 -.8 -.4 0 .4 .8 1.2 1.6 2
estimated κi
Note: Figure based on the 109 subjects for whom the αi , βi and κi estimates have
absolute value below 2. The (blue) lines indicate fitted Gumbel distributions
(see Appendix A2 for details). Figure A.2 shows a similar figure based on all
136 subjects.
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Table 2: Individual parameter estimates
Parameter Median Mean S.D. Min Max
αi 0.14 0.19 0.38 −0.89 1.75
βi -0.06 −0.14 0.51 −1.97 1.37
κi 0.18 0.24 0.22 −0.10 1.10
Notes: Table based on the 109 subjects for whom the αi , βi and κi estimates
have absolute value below 2. Table A.3 shows a similar table based on all 136
subjects.
























































-2-1.5-1 -.5 0 .5 1 1.5 2
estimated βi
Notes: Each dot represents one subject. Dotted lines indicate linear predictions
(intercept+slope). Specifically, we estimate βi = −0.05−0.44αi , κi = 0.19+0.28αi
and κi = 0.22−0.11βi . Figure based on the 109 subjects for whom the αi , βi and
κi estimates have absolute value below 2.
in line with spiteful/competitive preferences, i.e., an individual dislikes being behind
but likes being ahead of the other. The middle panel of Figure 4 reveals a strong and
positive correlation between αi and κi estimates (Spearman’s ρ = 0.423, p < 0.001, n =
109). This means that many individuals combine a distaste for disadvantageous inequity,
or, as Bruhin et al. (2019) call it, “behindness aversion,” with Kantian morality. For the
estimates of βi and κi we find a negative correlation (Spearman’s ρ = −0.173, p = 0.071,
n = 109). We also use copula methods to describe the joint parameter distributions for
the individual estimates of αi , βi and κi . As for the pairwise correlations reported above,
we observe that the individual estimates of αi , βi and κi are not statistically independent.
Appendix A2 provides more details.
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Table 3: Estimates at the aggregate level
1 type 2 types 3 types
Rep. agent Type 1 Type 2 Type 1 Type 2 Type 3
αk 0.14 0.06 0.27 −0.01 0.12 0.27
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.08) (0.03)
βk 0.00 0.09 −0.31 −0.07 0.24 −0.31
(0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08)
κk 0.21 0.23 0.18 0.21 0.23 0.18
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.02)
λk 0.25 0.28 0.16 0.32 0.22 0.15
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02)
φk 1.00 0.62 0.38 0.33 0.30 0.37
(-) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.05)
lnL -2336.9 -2154.4 -2131.7
EN (τ ) 0.00 4.25 17.80
ICL 4692.6 4355.3 4346.9
NEC - 0.023 0.087
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Table based on our ‘core
sample’ of 109 subjects. In these estimations, we impose rk = 1 (i.e. logarithmic
utility) for all types. Table A.4 in Appendix A3 shows estimates based on the
full sample. Table A.5 in Appendix A3 shows the estimates of a 4-type model.
4.2 Aggregate estimations
We now turn to estimation of preferences at the aggregate level (see section 3.2 for de-
tails). To distinguish these estimates from the individual ones, we use an index k to
designate the type. Table 3 presents the estimates of the finite mixture models for one,
two and three types.
4.2.1 The representative agent
When assuming only one type, that is, a representative agent, we obtain the estimates
α0 = 0.14, β0 = 0.00, and κ0 = 0.21, where the index 0 stands for the representative agent.
In other words, the representative agent dislikes disadvantageous inequity, is indifferent
with respect to advantageous inequality, and has a positive degree of Kantian morality.
20
The representative agent thus exhibits Kantian morality and behindness aversion.
4.2.2 The two- and three-type models
As can be seen in Table 3, in both multi-type models all types exhibit Kantian morality
(κk > 0), roughly of the same order of magnitude as the representative agent. There
is much stronger heterogeneity in terms of the inequity aversion parameters αk and βk:
some types exhibit behindness aversion (αk > 0) while other types are (close to) indifferent
to behindness (αk ≈ 0); and some types disliking behind ahead (βk > 0) while other types
like it (βk < 0).
More specifically, when assuming two types, the most common type (Type 1) exhibits
(mild) inequity aversion, with parameter estimates α1 = 0.06 and β1 = 0.09, combined
with a degree of Kantian morality κ1 = 0.23. This type represents about 62% of the sub-
jects. The other type, Type 2, exhibits a combination of strong spite (“negative altruism”)
and Kantian morality, with α2 = 0.27, β2 = −0.31, and κ2 = 0.18. 18
For each subject i, we estimate the posterior probability τi,k that i belongs to type k
(as defined in (14)). By taking the largest value τi,k for each subject i, we can assign each
of the subjects to one of the types. Table A.6 in Appendix A3 lists the chosen strategies
per game protocol type based on this classification. “Type 2 subjects”, who combine spite
and Kantian morality, mostly choose to always defect (D,D,D) in the SPDs (in 87%) of
the cases, while “Type 1 subjects”, who combine inequity aversion and Kantian morality,
choose (D,D,D) less frequently (38%) and often conditionally cooperate (C,C,D) instead
(32%). Similarly, in the TGs, Type 2 subjects most frequently choose not to invest as first
mover and to “keep” as second mover (N,K) (85%), while Type 1 subjects most frequently
invest as first mover and “give” as a second mover (I,G) (43%). In the UGs, Type 2 subjects
mostly choose the unequal option as a first mover (74%) and accept unfair offers as a
second mover (97%). Instead, Type 1 subjects most frequently propose an equal payoff
(68%) and accept fewer unequal offers (88%).
When assuming three types, for all types we again estimate a positive Kantian moral-
ity parameter κk. In comparison with the results under the two-types approach, Type 3
is very close to the previous Type 2. This type is again characterized as combining spite
with Kantian morality, and represents a similar fraction of the population (37%).19 The
18The finding that a sizeable share of the subjects (here 38%) are both spiteful (αk > 0 and βk < 0) and
moral (κk > 0) agrees with a recent theoretical result that preference evolution in some settings leads to a
combination of self-interest, spite and Kantian morality (see Alger et al., 2020).
19In panel A of Table A.7 (see Appendix A3), we show a transition matrix for the two-types and three-
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new Type 2 combines (relatively strong) inequity aversion with Kantian morality. It rep-
resents around 17% of the population. Type 1 is very close to Homo moralis. The inequity
aversion parameters α1 and β1 are not significantly different from zero (at the 5% level),
while the Kantian morality κ1 is positive and significant. This type represents 33% of the
population. In sum: under the three-types approach, Type 1 displays Kantian morality,
Type 2 is inequity averse and moral, and Type 3 is spiteful and moral.
In terms of chosen strategies, Type 3 behaves almost identical as Type 2 in the two-
types model. The new Types 1 and Type 2 differ in some respects. In the SPDs, the new
Type 2 acts conditionally cooperative more often than Type 1. Similarly, Type 2 chooses
to ”give” more often than Type 1 in the TGs. In the UGs, Type 2 refuses unequal offers
more frequently than Type 1.
In sum, the aggregate estimates lead to two observations. First, we observe relatively
little heterogeneity in estimates of the morality parameter κk. In most cases, κk is around
0.2, showing that most people are well described by having Kantian morality concerns.
Second, we note that in both multi-type models, we do not observe types who are best
described by pure self-interest (αk = βk = κk = 0).20 Nonetheless, self-interest is still an
important driver for all the types.
4.2.3 Comparing the one-, two-, and three-types models
Clearly, adding more types improves the fit of the model, but this comes at the cost of par-
simony as well as precision of allocating individuals to types. Information criteria like
the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) are not well suited to select the number of clus-
ters (or in our case, ‘types’) in finite mixture models. In a recent overview paper on the
use of finite mixture models, McLachlan et al. (2019) recommend using the ‘integrated
completed likelihood’ (or ‘integrated classification’, ICL, Biernacki, Celeux, & Govaert,
2000). This criterion is approximated by
ICL = −2lnL+ d lnN +EN (τ ), (15)
where the log-likelihood function lnL is defined as in (13), d is the number of estimated
parameters, and N is the number of individuals in our sample. The last term in (15) is
types models. All but one subject who is classified as Type 2 in the two-types model, are classified as Type
3 in the three-types model. All subjects who were classified as Type 1 in the two-types model are now
distributed across the new Types 1 and 2.
20This is in line with the findings by Bruhin et al. (2019).
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the entropy





τi,k lnτi,k , (16)
where τi,k is the estimated posterior probability of individual i belonging to type k, as
defined in (14). This implies that the stronger individuals are assigned to types (i.e. all
τi,k’s close to zero or one), the lower the entropy will be. In other words, the ICL extends
the BIC by adding an additional penalty if individuals are assigned imprecisely to types.
Figure 5 shows the distributions of the estimated posterior probability τi,k (of indi-
vidual i belonging to type k) for the two-type and three-type models. In all cases, most
estimated τi,k are very close to zero or 1, which implies that most individuals are quite
precisely assigned to a type. For the two-types model, virtually all estimated τi,k are close
to zero or one. For the three-types model, some individuals are imprecisely classified to
either Type 1 or Type 2.
Bruhin et al. (2019) use the ‘normalized entropy criterion’ (NEC, Celeux & Soromenho,





where lnL(1) is the log-likelihood of the representative agent model and lnL(K) the log-
likelihood of the model with K types. Hence, the NEC weighs the precision of the type
classifications τi,k by the increase in the log-likelihood compared to the representative
agent model.
Table 3 shows statistics for both the ICL and the NEC. For both metrics, a lower score
indicates a more preferred model. The NEC selects the two-types model and the ICL se-
lects the three-types model. Table A.5 in Appendix A3 shows estimates and goodness-of-
fit metrics for a four-types model. The four-types model performs worse on both criteria
than the two-types and three-types models in Table 3. Note that marginal improvement
in the ICL score is largest when going from the representative agent to the two-types
model. In sum, assuming two types instead of a representative agent brings us a long
way in capturing the heterogeneity in the population.
4.3 Robustness
4.3.1 Estimating risk attitudes
In the main analysis, we imposed values for the CRRA parameter r. In the individual
estimations, we based ri on the decision in the lottery task while in the aggregate esti-
23




































































Notes: Distributions of the estimated posterior probability τi,k of individual i
belonging to type k for the two-types and three-types finite mixture models re-
ported in Table 3.
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mations we assumed that everyone has logarithmic utility (i.e. rk = 1). We also estimate
the CRRA parameter r alongside the social preference and Kantian morality parameters.
Doing so does not affect our estimates by much.
First, at the individual level, estimating ri alongside the preference parameters (αi ,
βi , κi) does not affect the estimates by much. The estimated preference parameters are
strongly correlated (Spearman rank correlations: ρ = 0.639,p < 0.001, n = 109 for αi , ρ =
0.566,p < 0.001, n = 109 for βi , and ρ = 0.606,p < 0.001 for κi) although the correlation
between the imposed and estimated ri values is weak (ρ = 0.069,p = 0.478). The estimates
of αi , βi and κi are not systematically smaller or larger using either method (signed-rank
tests, p = 0.198, n = 109 for αi , p = 0.228, n = 109 for βi , and p = 0.388, n = 109 for κi).
Second, estimations of the finite mixture models that include the estimation of a
CRRA parameter rk for each type k lead to a value for rk close to 1 in most cases (see
Table A.8 in Appendix A3). As a result, the estimated social preference and Kantian
morality parameters change very little.21
4.3.2 Risk neutrality
In yet another robustness check we estimate the social preference and Kantian moral-
ity parameters under the alternative assumption that all subjects are risk neutral (i.e.,
ri = 0 for all subjects i). Figure 6 shows scatter plots of individual parameter estimates
under both assumptions, with estimates under risk neutrality on the horizontal axis and
estimates under constant (individual specific) relative risk aversion (CRRA) on the verti-
cal axis. Each dot represents an individual subject. The diagrams suggest that the risk-
neutral and CRRA estimates are strongly correlated. Indeed, for the inequity parameter
αi (when behind) the Spearman rank correlation is ρ = 0.802. For the inequity parameter
βi (when ahead) it is ρ = 0.774, and for the Kantian morality parameter κi it is ρ = 0.627
(all three rank correlations hold for p < 0.001, n = 109).
The middle panel in Figure 6 also shows that the βi estimates are much higher under
risk neutrality than under CRRA.22 Indeed, for 94 out of 109 subjects, the risk-neutral
estimate is higher than the CRRA estimate (signed-rank test, p < 0.001).23 By contrast,
21Table A.7 shows that for both two-types (panel B) and three-types (panel C) models, subjects are sepa-
rated in almost the same groups as when we impose rk = 1.
22One can easily see how assuming risk neutrality would bias estimates of βk . Take for example the UG
protocol. Both risk aversion and ‘aheadness aversion’ (βi > 0) would induce one to choose E over U .
23Moreover, for most subjects (80 out of 109), βi is positive under risk neutrality (signed-rank test, p <
0.001).
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estimated κi (risk-neutral)
Notes: Figures shows estimates smaller than 2 in absolute value. Dotted lines
indicate 45 degree lines. Figure based on our ‘core sample’ of 109 subjects.
the risk-neutral estimates of κi (80 out of 109, signed-rank test: p < 0.001) and αi (64
out of 109, signed-rank test: p = 0.068) are lower for most subjects than under CRRA.24
For the majority of subjects (72 out of 109), assuming CRRA preferences instead of risk
neutrality leads to a higher log-likelihood, indeed indicating a better fit under CRRA
preferences.
Table 4 shows the estimates of finite mixture models under risk neutrality. Comparing
these results with those in Table 3, one sees that, qualitatively, estimates of the parameters
αk and κk are not much affected. For all types in Tables 3 and 4, αk and κk are positive,
under both risk hypotheses, although the Kantian morality parameter values somewhat
lower under risk neutrality than under CRRA. In line with the individual parameter es-
timates (see the middle panel in Figure 6), the finite mixture estimates of the parameters
β tend to be much higher under risk neutrality than under CRRA. Moreover, under risk-
neutrality, all estimates of βk are non-negative, in contrast to the CRRA estimates, where
we observed βk < 0 for some types k.25
The ICL criterion allows comparison of the fit of the CRRA and risk-neutral models,
respectively (see Tables 3 and 4). For any given number of types, the CRRA model has
24Most risk-neutral estimates of κi (96 out of 109) and αi (92 out of 109) are positive (signed-rank tests,
p < 0.001)
25Table A.7 shows that the assignment of subjects to types for the risk-neutral two-types (panel D) model,
is very similar to when we impose rk = 1. For the three-types models (panel E), the type classification is
again similar under both assumptions, but some who are classified as “Type 2” with rk = 1 are classified as
“Type 1” under risk-neutrality.
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Table 4: Estimates at the aggregate level (assuming risk neutrality)
1 type 2 types 3 types
Rep. agent Type 1 Type 2 Type 1 Type 2 Type 3
αk 0.17 0.13 0.19 0.18 0.01 0.19
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02)
βk 0.25 0.36 0.00 0.26 0.50 0.00
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.03)
κk 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.10
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.05) (0.01)
λk 7.62 8.98 4.01 9.29 6.92 3.79
(0.60) (0.95) (0.51) (1.17) (0.79) (0.36)
φk 1.00 0.64 0.36 0.48 0.18 0.34
(-) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
lnL -2426.8 -2247.6 -2217.9
EN (τ ) 0.00 5.31 14.20
ICL 4872.5 4542.7 4515.6
NEC - 0.030 0.068
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Table based on our ‘core
sample’ of 109 subjects.
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Notes: Figures shows estimates smaller than 2 in absolute value. Dotted lines
indicate 45 degree lines. Figure based on our ‘core sample’ of 109 subjects.
a lower ICL score than the risk-neutral model. For the three-types model, for example,
the ICL score under the CRRA assumption is quite a bit lower than under risk neutrality
(4343.6 versus 4515.6), showing that the CRRA model considerably improves the fit over
the risk-neutrality model.
4.3.3 Rational expectations
So far, we assumed that people maximize expected utility given their (reported) sub-
jective expectations. In this subsection we investigate what happens to the estimated
preference parameters if we take rational expectations instead.
Figure 7 shows correlations between the individual estimates using subjective and
rational expectations. For all three preference parameters, the estimates under the two
assumptions are strongly correlated. For the inequity parameter αi (when behind) the
Spearman rank correlation is ρ = 0.553. For the inequity parameter βi (when ahead) it
is ρ = 0.635, and for the Kantian morality parameter κi it is ρ = 0.344 (for all three rank
correlations: p < 0.001, n = 109). For most subjects, the log-likelihood is larger when we
assume rational expectations instead of subjective expectations (67 out of 109, signed-
rank test: p = 0.043), indicating that assuming rational expectations actually improves
the fit for most subjects.
Table 5 shows the finite mixture estimates when we assume rational expectations. The
representative agent with rational expectations is characterized by a combination of spite
(αk > 0,βk < 0) and morality (κk > 0). Compared to the model with subjective expectations
28
Table 5: Estimates at the aggregate level (assuming rational expectations)
1 type 2 types 3 types
Rep. agent Type 1 Type 2 Type 1 Type 2 Type 3
αk 0.30 0.08 0.67 0.04 0.13 0.68
(0.05) (0.03) (0.07) (0.05) (0.10) (0.09)
βk −0.28 0.04 −0.52 −0.03 0.19 −0.51
(0.05) (0.06) (0.09) (0.07) (0.14) (0.11)
κk 0.36 0.31 0.31 0.18 0.49 0.32
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.10) (0.05)
λk 0.31 0.28 0.23 0.28 0.24 0.21
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
φk 1.00 0.54 0.46 0.42 0.19 0.39
(-) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
lnL -2462.0 -2157.1 -2097.6
EN (τ ) 0.00 2.58 7.52
ICL 4942.7 4539.0 4270.1
NEC - 0.008 0.025
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Table based on our ‘core
sample’ of 109 subjects. For all types, we assume logarithmic utility (rk = 1) and
rational expectations.
(see Table 3), the estimates for αk and κk are larger when we assume rational expectations.
The estimate for βk is negative when we assume rational expectations, where it was zero
under subjective expectations. For the representative agent model, the log-likelihood is
lower when assuming rational expectations. For the two-types model and three-types
model, assuming rational expectations leads to qualitatively similar results as under sub-
jective expectations. For the two-types model, Type 1 again displays a combination of
(mild) inequity aversion and morality, Type 2 combines spite with morality.26 The ICL
scores of both multi-type models are somewhat lower under rational expectations, indi-
cating a slightly better fit under rational expectations. Most importantly however, the
estimated preference parameters for the multi-type models are very similar under both
assumptions.
26Table A.7 (panels F and G) shows that the assignment of subjects to types is similar under subjective
and rational expectations.
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4.4 The value added of Kantian morality
In the preceding sections, we showed that estimated Kantian morality parameters tend to
be positive, both at the individual and aggregate level. In this subsection, we benchmark
the added value of the Kantian morality parameter against other parameters, and also
against reciprocity.
4.4.1 Individual estimations
We conduct likelihood-ratio tests to see if adding the Kantian morality parameter κi to
a model with only the two social preference parameters αi and βi improves the fit. The
likelihood-ratio tests reveal that adding κi improves the fit for 21 individuals at the 5%
level (and for 32 individuals at the 10% level). For comparison, likelihood ratio tests
when adding either αi to (βi ,κi), or βi to (αi ,κi), improves the fit at the 5% level for 20
and 26 individuals, respectively (at the 10% level, for 25 (αi) and 37 (βi) individuals).
Hence, in terms of value added at the individual level, all three preference parameters
are in roughly the same ballpark.
A more general approach is to consider all models that are nested in (1) and apply
standard information criteria. We use both the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) and
Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC), each of which is based on the log-likelihoods and
adds a penalty for each parameter. The lower score, the better fit. More precisely, the
criteria are:
BIC = −2ln(L) + d ln(18), (18)
and
AIC = −2ln(L) + 2d, (19)
where ln(18) in (18) comes from the 18 observations per subject. Since ln18 ≈ 2.89 > 2,
BIC gives a heavier penalty per parameter than AIC.
Table 6 shows the results. The left panel shows which model provides the best fit ac-
cording to BIC. For 37 subjects (33.9%) pure self-interest (αi = βi = κi = 0) has the lowest
BIC score. For the remaining 72 subjects, some combinations of social preferences and/or
moral concerns improve the model’s fit. For 23 subjects, (21.1%) pure Homo moralis pref-
erences (αi = βi = 0, κi , 0) provides the best individual fit. For another 11 subjects,
models with κi in combination with αi and/or βi have the lowest BIC scores. In sum, for
34 subjects (31.2%), the model with the lowest BIC score includes κi . In comparison, αi
and βi are included in the model with the lowest BIC score for 23 subjects (21.1%) and 35
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Table 6: Best individual fit
BIC AIC
Parameters Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage
αi ,βi ,κi 2 1.8 6 5.5
αi ,βi 7 6.4 6 5.5
αi ,κi 5 4.6 8 7.3
βi ,κi 4 3.7 10 9.2
αi 9 8.3 11 10.1
βi 22 20.2 18 16.5
κi 23 21.1 24 22.0
- 37 33.9 26 23.9
Notes: Entries indicate the number of subjects for whom the specific model pro-
vides the lowest BIC or AIC score respectively. Table based on our ‘core sample’
of 109 subjects.
subjects (32.0%), respectively. The right panel shows the results from the same exercise,
but now applied to AIC. Then the best-fitting model at the individual level includes the
parameter κi for 48 subjects (or 44.0%). Again, a larger number of subjects than for αi
(31 subjects, or 28.4%) and also slightly more subjects than βi (40 subjects, or 36.7%).
4.4.2 Aggregate estimations
We also evaluate the value added of Kantian morality for the finite mixture estimations.
Table A.9 in Appendix A3 shows estimates for finite mixture models with only αk and
βk (i.e. where κi = 0). For any given number of types, these fixed mixture estimates give
substantially higher ICL scores than the model including Kantian morality, indicating
that fixed mixture estimates that include the parameter κi provide a better fit.
4.4.3 Reciprocity vs. Kantian morality
We can compare the value added of the Kantian morality parameter, to the value if one
were to instead of Kantian morality add reciprocity. For this purpose, we modify the
utility function in (1) to replace the Kantian morality term by a term that represents
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where q = 1 if the other player ‘misbehaved’ and q = 0 otherwise. Following Charness
and Rabin (2002), we label a first-mover action as misbehavior if it excludes an outcome
that has maximal joint monetary payoffs. For our case this means that defecting as a first
mover in a SPD protocol (if 2R > T +S, which holds for 5 out of 6 SPDs), and not investing
in a TG protocol constitutes misbehavior (note, however, that the δi term cancels in latter
case, as not investing will lead to equal payoffs for both players). In addition, we also
label not proposing an equal split in the UGs as misbehavior.
In Table A.10 in Appendix A3 we provide the results of finite mixture models based
on (20). The three-types model has the lowest ICL score among the reciprocity models.
Based on the ICL score, the three-types reciprocity model performs better than the mix-
ture models with only αk and βk (see A.9). This shows that, adding reciprocity improves
the fit of the model. Importantly however, the three-types model that allows for Kan-
tian morality instead of reciprocity has an even lower ICL score, suggesting that Kantian
morality adds more than reciprocity in our setting.
4.4.4 Out-of-sample predictions
So far, we evaluated the performance of different models based on information criteria.
As an alternative, we consider the predictive accuracy of different models by conducting
out-of-sample predictions. For each of the 18 game protocols, we estimate parameters
based on the other 17 game protocols, and use the estimates to predict the choice for the
one omitted game protocol. We conduct these analyses both at the individual level and
the aggregate level.
Figure 8 illustrates the results, by comparing the predictive accuracy of the model
with α, β and κ, to self-interest (α = β = κ = 0), a model without Kantian morality (α,
β) and a model allowing for negative reciprocity (α, β, δ). The left panel of Figure 8
32























































Notes: Accuracy of out-of-sample predictions, based on individual estimates
(left panel) and finite mixture models with two-types (right panel). Plots
show cumulative frequency plots for the average fraction of correctly predicted
choices per game protocol. Figure based on our ‘core sample’ of 109 subjects.
compares the predictive accuracy based on individual estimates. All models clearly out-
perform random choice (which would lead to 20.8% accurate predictions in expectation).
The model allowing for Kantian morality (α, β, κ) outperforms the other models in terms
of predictive accuracy. The (α, β, κ)-model on average predicts 56.0% of choices cor-
rectly, somewhat more than the (α, β) and (α, β, δ) models, which give 53.4% and 54.3%
average accuracy, respectively. All models allowing for social preferences and/or moral-
ity perform much better than when assuming self-interest, which gives 48.1% average
accuracy.
The right panel of Figure 8 shows the predictive accuracy of finite mixture models
assuming two types. Compared to the individual estimations, the gap between the model
allowing for Kantian morality (α, β, κ) and the other models is larger for the two-types
models. The two-types model with α, β and κ predicts 54.8% of choices correctly, which
is better than the two-types (α, β)-model and reciprocity model (α, β, δ) which give
50.2% and 49.8% accuracy respectively. Note that the predictive accuracy of the two-
types model allowing for Kantian morality (54.8%) is not far from the model allowing
for Kantian morality with individual estimates (56.0%).27 This provides further evidence
that the model effectively captures the heterogeneity in preferences.
27When allowing for Kantian morality (α, β, κ), a model with a representative agent (1 type) performs
worse (51.4% accuracy) than the two-types model, and a model with three-types performs only slightly
better (55.4%) than the two-types model.
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5 Concluding discussion
In this paper, we report results from a laboratory experiment designed to evaluate the
explanatory power of Kantian morality in standard strategic interactions. To distinguish
Kantian morality from other social concerns, we posit a general utility function that nests
several much studied preference classes, such as pure self-interest, altruism, spite, and
inequity aversion, and of course Kantian morality. We structurally estimate the prefer-
ence parameters of this utility function, allowing for risk aversion and controlling for
the beliefs about opponent’s play. We obtain both individual and aggregate estimates,
where the latter consists of estimating the parameters for a representative agent, as well
as identifying a small number of endogenously determined “preference types”.
The individual estimates suggest substantial heterogeneity. This heterogeneity limits
the usefulness of a representative agent approach. However, we find that the subjects’
behaviors are well captured by models with two or three preference types. The two-types
model suggests that 62% of the subjects display a combination of mild inequity aversion
with Kantian morality, and the remaining 38% a combination of Kantian morality and
strong spite. Within the three-types model, again one type is characterized by a combi-
nation of inequity aversion and Kantian morality (representing 30% of the population)
and 37% of the population appear to combine Kantian morality with spite. However, now
there is another type which displays only Kantian morality, representing 33% of the pop-
ulation. Quite remarkably, all the preference types—both the representative agent and
the preference types within the two-types and the three-types model—have an estimated
Kantian morality parameter κk of around 0.2, which given the posited utility function
means that the weight attached to the Kantian moral concern is about one quarter of the
weight attached to the own material payoff.
Our experimental design was motivated by findings in the theoretical literature that
investigates the evolutionary foundations of preferences in strategic interactions (see Al-
ger & Weibull, 2019, for a recent survey). This literature shows that evolution by natural
selection favors Kantian morality (see, in particular, Bergstrom (1995) and Alger and
Weibull (2013)). As it turns out, our results are in fact in line with an even more recent
contribution to this theoretical literature. In a model that enables analysis of the long-run
impact of population structure on preferences, Alger et al. (2020) show that preferences
that combine Kantian morality with either altruism or spite are favored by evolution by
natural selection.28
28This result does not contradict that of Alger and Weibull (2013), which is shown by Alger et al. (2020)
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Compared with other experimental studies with structural preference estimations,
our results agree with those of Bruhin et al. (2019) in that their behavioral data is largely
consistent with there being a small number of “preference types”. Our findings further
agree with Bruhin et al. (2019) in that they do not either find evidence that the purely
selfish Homo oeconomicus explains their behavioral data. A more detailed comparison is
more involved, since their experimental design differs from ours, and they do not include
Kantian morality. Our results further agree broadly with those in the horse race study
by Miettinen et al. (2020), although our richer data set allows us to capture the complex
combination of subjects’ motives that their study cannot address.
As for all laboratory experiments, establishing external validity would be highly de-
sirable (Levitt & List, 2007). It would further be interesting to examine whether results
similar to ours also obtain in a representative sample, along the lines of the studies by
Bellemare et al. (2008) and Cettolin and Suetens (2018). Also, while our experiment was
conducted on a WEIRD population (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010), evolution-
ary theory suggests that the qualitative nature of preferences guiding behavior in strate-
gic interactions should be similar across the world, although certain differences between
populations may be expected to influence the relative importance of self-interest, social
concerns, and Kantian morality. In particular, since evolutionary theory suggests that
migration patterns and the involvement in inter-group conflict are expected to impact
preferences guiding behavior in strategic interactions (Alger et al., 2020; Choi & Bowles,
2007), this theory delivers testable predictions that may help explain cross-cultural dif-
ferences (Falk et al., 2018) and also perhaps differences between men and women (Croson
& Gneezy, 2009).
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Appendices (For Online Publication)
Appendix A1 Distinguishing Kantian morality from social
preferences
The Ultimatum Game protocol having been analyzed in detail in the main text (Subsec-
tion 2.3), we here analyze the other two game protocols. Throughout we assume risk
neutrality; this is only for notational simplicity, the only difference being that the mone-
tary payoffs would be replaced by the associated monetary utilities.
In the Trust Game protocol (Figure 1b), a behavior strategy is a vector x = (x1,x2) ∈
X = [0,1]2, where x1 is the probability with which the player trusts the receiver, and x2
the probability with which he honors trust (if the sender trusts him).29 Then the expected
utility (as defined in (1)) from playing x = (x1,x2) against y = (y1, y2) is (omitting the factor
1/2):
ui (x,y) = (1−κi)[x1 [y2R+ (1− y2)S] + (1− x1)P ] (21)
+ (1−κi)[y1 [x2R+ (1− x2)T ] + (1− y1)P ]
+κi {x1 [x2R+ (1− x2)S] + (1− x1)P }
+κi {x1 [x2R+ (1− x2)T ] + (1− x1)P }
− [αix1 (1− y2) + βiy1 (1− x2)] (T − S) .
Hence, for a subject who believes that the opponent plays ŷ:
∂ui (x, ŷ)
∂x1




= (1−κi)ŷ1 (R− T ) +κix1 (2R− S − T ) + βi ŷ1 (T − S) . (23)
The social preference parameters αi and βi represent consequentialistic motives: they
give weight to the monetary payoff consequences given what the subject believes about
the opponent’s actual play. By contrast, the Kantian morality parameter κi captures a
deontological motive, such as “duty” or “to do the right thing”, which ((following Alger &
Weibull, 2013) we take to be to evaluate one’s strategy in the light of what would happen
if, hypothetically, the opponent would also use the same strategy.
29Since each player has only one decision node, the distinction between mixed and behavioral strategies
is immaterial.
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Turning now to the Sequential Prisoners’ Dilemma game protocol (as in Figure 1a),
denote by x1 the probability of playing C when moving first, x2 the probability of play-
ing C when moving second after play of C by the opponent, and and x3 the probability
of playing C when moving second after play of D by the opponent. Hence, the vector
x = (x1,x2,x3) ∈ [0,1]3 is the player’s behavior strategy in the symmetrically randomized
sequential prisoners’ dilemma. Then the expected utility (as defined in (1)) from playing
x = (x1,x2,x3) against y = (y1, y2, y3) is (again omitting the factor 1/2):
ui (x,y) = (1−κi)[x1y2R+ x1 (1− y2)S + (1− x1)y3T + (1− x1) (1− y3)P ] (24)
+ (1−κi)[y1x2R+ y1 (1− x2)T + (1− y1)x3S + (1− y1) (1− x3)P ]
+κi [x1x2R+ x1 (1− x2)S + (1− x1)x3T + (1− x1) (1− x3)P ]
+κi [x1x2R+ x1 (1− x2)T + (1− x1)x3S + (1− x1) (1− x3)P ]
−αi [x1 (1− y2) + (1− y1)x3] (T − S)
− βi [(1− x1)y3 + y1 (1− x2)] (T − S) .
Hence, for a subject who believes that the opponent would play ŷ one obtains:
∂ui (x, ŷ)
∂x1
= (1−κi)[S − P + ŷ2 (R− S)− ŷ3 (T − P )] (25)
+κi [x2 (2R− S − T ) + (1− x3) (S + T − 2P )]
+ βi ŷ3 (T − S)−αi (1− ŷ2) (T − S) ,
∂ui (x, ŷ)
∂x2




= (1−κi) (1− ŷ1) (S − P ) +κi (1− x1) (T + S − 2P )−αi (1− ŷ1) (T − S) . (27)
Again, these equations show that an individual with a Kantian moral concern (κi > 0) is
not only influenced by his belief about the opponent’s strategy, but also by what he would
himself do at every decision node of the game tree.
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Appendix A2 Copula estimation
We use copula methods to describe the joint parameter distributions for the individual
estimates of αi , βi and κi . For this, let Xα, Xβ and Xκ be random variables, possibly
statistically dependent, with marginal CDFs Fα, Fβ and Fκ. By Sklar’s Theorem, their














We follow a two-step approach (Joe & Xu, 1996; Cherubini, Luciano, & Vecchiato,
2004). First, we fit the marginal distributions. For this, we assume that each preference
parameter follows a Gumbel distribution, with CDF











− (x − a) /b − e−(x−a)/b
]
.
The empirical distributions of αi and κi have a relatively long right tail (see 3, which fits
well with the Gumbel distribution. The empirical distribution of βi has a relatively long
left tail, therefore, we fit the reverse distribution, i.e. we fit the distribution of −βi .





















+ (− lnFκ (xκ))ω
]1/ω)
for some ω ≥ 1, where ω = 1 represents statistical independence.
In both steps we use maximum likelihood to estimate parameters. Table A.1 shows the
estimated parameters, and Figure ?? plots the estimated marginal distributions together
with the empirical distributions. For the joint distribution, we estimate ω = 1.30. To put
this into perspective, this estimate implies a Kendall’s tau of τ = 1 − 11.30 = 0.23. This
compares well to the bivariate correlations (see Section 4.1). Expressed in Kendall’s tau,
the correlation between αi and −βi is τ = 0.21, for αi and κi we obtain τ = 0.29 and for
−βi and κi we obtain τ = 0.11.
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Appendix A3 Additional tables and figures
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Note: Figure based on all 136 subjects.
Table A.1: Individual parameter estimates (all subjects)
Panel A: Marginal distributions αi −βi κi
a 0.02 −0.11 0.14
b 0.34 0.49 0.16
Panel B: Joint distribution
ω 1.30
Notes: Table based on estimates from our core sample of 109 subjects.
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Table A.2: Lottery choices
Outcomes
Lottery A B Frequency Percentage ri
Sessions 2-8
1 18 18 50 43.9% 1.61
2 22 15 24 21.1% 1.00
3 26 12 18 15.8% 0.39
4 30 9 3 2.6% 0.25
5 34 6 8 7.0% 0.08
6 37 2 11 9.7% -0.09
Session 1
1 18 18 5 22.7% 4.71
2 22 16 3 13.6% 2.95
3 26 14 6 27.3% 1.19
4 30 12 4 18.2% 0.77
5 34 10 2 9.1% 0.32
6 40 4 2 9.1% -0.13
Notes: Lottery choices in the Eckel and Grossman (2002) risk elicitation task.
‘Outcomes’ are the payoffs denoted in “points”, see Appendix A4 for the in-
structions. The final column lists the implied ri parameters for each lottery
choice. Note that after the first session, we slightly adjusted the outcomes to
better estimate ri . Table based on all 136 subjects.
Table A.3: Individual parameter estimates (all subjects)
Parameter Median Mean S.D. Min Max
αi 0.17 599.72 5938.54 −0.89 68186.74
βi −0.11 50.30 697.75 −496.78 8105.22
κi 0.20 189.62 2200.83 −0.29 25666.71
Notes: Table based on estimates from all 136 subjects.
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Note: All estimates of αi , βi and κi larger than 2 in absolute value are grouped
in bins (“<” and “>”) at the extremes of the horizontal axis. Figure based on all
136 subjects.
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Table A.4: Estimates at the aggregate level (all subjects)
1 type 2 types 3 types
Rep. agent Type 1 Type 2 Type 1 Type 2 Type 3
αk 0.15 0.08 0.26 0.11 0.03 0.24
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.09) (0.05)
βk 0.00 0.11 −0.39 0.02 0.24 −0.45
(0.02) (0.03) (0.11) (0.05) (0.07) (0.11)
κk 0.21 0.24 0.17 0.19 0.35 0.16
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.10) (0.03)
λk 0.26 0.29 0.17 0.31 0.22 0.16
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
φk 1.00 0.60 0.40 0.48 0.17 0.36
(-) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04)
lnL -2898.0 -2638.3 -2587.6
EN (τ ) 0.00 6.15 14.87
ICL 5815.7 5326.9 5258.8
NEC - 0.024 0.048
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Table based on all 136 subjects. For all
types, we assume logarithmic utility (rk = 1).
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Table A.5: The 4-types model
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4
αk −0.02 0.47 0.27 0.13
(0.07) (0.12) (0.04) (0.11)
βk 0.17 −1.10 −0.37 0.04
(0.08) (0.19) (0.11) (0.11)
κk 0.29 0.52 0.18 0.18
(0.06) (0.07) (0.02) (0.05)
λk 0.23 1.07 0.15 0.24
(0.03) (0.18) (0.02) (0.05)
φk 0.23 0.08 0.32 0.37
(0.05) (0.10) (0.06) (0.11)
lnL -2130.5
EN (τ ) 23.95
ICL 4374.1
NEC 0.116
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. For all types, we impose log-utility (rk =
1). Estimation results from models with 1, 2 and 3 types can be found in Table
3. Based on our ‘core sample’ of 109 subjects.
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Table A.6: Strategies by type
1 type 2 types 3 types
Rep. agent Type 1 Type 2 Type 1 Type 2 Type 3
Sequential Prisoner’s Dilemmas
C,C,C 2% 3% 0% 2% 4% 0%
C,C,D 21% 32% 5% 21% 43% 5%
C,D,C 0% 1% 0% 1% 0% 0%
C,D,D 9% 12% 4% 19% 4% 4%
D,C,C 2% 3% 0% 3% 2% 0%
D,C,D 7% 9% 3% 6% 13% 3%
D,D,C 2% 3% 2% 5% 1% 2%
D,D,D 57% 38% 87% 43% 24% 87%
Trust Games
I,G 29% 43% 5% 31% 56% 5%
I,K 17% 23% 7% 38% 6% 7%
N,G 5% 5% 3% 2% 9% 3%
N,K 50% 28% 85% 30% 28% 84%
Ultimatum Games
E,A 44% 57% 23% 52% 61% 22%
E,F 8% 12% 3% 9% 15% 3%
U,A 48% 32% 74% 39% 24% 74%
U,A 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Notes: Relative frequencies (in %) of chosen strategies based on the 1, 2, and
three-types models reported in Table 3. Subjects are assigned a type based on
the type posterior probability τi,k (that subject i belongs to type k, see eq. (14)).
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Table A.7: Transitions between types
Panel A: 2 types and 3 types (ln)
2 types (ln)
3 types (ln) Type 1 Type 2
Type 1 36 0
Type 2 31 1
Type 3 0 41
Panel B: 2 types, ln and crra Panel C: 3 types, ln and crra
2 types (crra) 3 types (crra)
2 types (ln) Type 1 Type 2 3 types (ln) Type 1 Type 2 Type 3
Type 1 67 0 Type 1 31 4 1
Type 2 1 41 Type 2 1 30 1
Type 3 0 0 41
Panel D: 2 types, ln and risk neutral Panel E: 3 types, ln and risk neutral
2 types (risk neutral) 3 types (risk neutral)
2 types (ln) Type 1 Type 2 3 types (ln) Type 1 Type 2 Type 3
Type 1 65 2 Type 1 31 3 2
Type 2 5 37 Type 2 17 15 0
Type 3 5 0 36
Panel F: 2 types, subjective and ra-
tional expectations (ln)
Panel G: 3 types, subjective and
rational expectations (ln)
2 types (rational exp.) 3 types (rational exp.)
2 types (ln) Type 1 Type 2 3 types (ln) Type 1 Type 2 Type 3
Type 1 57 10 Type 1 32 3 1
Type 2 2 40 Type 2 11 17 4
Type 3 4 0 37
Notes: Each panel shows transition matrices between types in different finite
mixture models. Subjects are assigned a type based on the posterior probability
τi,k (that subject i belongs to type k, see eq. (14)).
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Table A.8: Estimates at the aggregate level, incl. CRRA parameter rk
1 type 2 types 3 types
Rep. agent Type 1 Type 2 Type 1 Type 2 Type 3
αk 0.15 0.07 0.28 0.06 0.11 0.28
(0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07)
βk 0.03 0.13 −0.34 0.11 0.19 −0.37
(0.03) (0.03) (0.17) (0.12) (0.07) (0.14)
κk 0.19 0.21 0.19 0.18 0.26 0.20
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
λk 0.37 0.44 0.12 2.74 0.10 0.11
(0.11) (0.20) (0.06) (0.44) (0.07) (0.07)
rk 0.88 0.86 1.07 0.33 1.26 1.14
(0.09) (0.12) (0.29) (0.27) (0.21) (0.25)
φk 1.00 0.63 0.37 0.30 0.31 0.39
(-) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
lnL -2335.1 -2152.5 -2122.4
EN (τ ) 0.00 4.17 14.80
ICL 4693.6 4360.8 4339.3
NEC - 0.023 0.070
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Table based on our ‘core
sample’ of 109 subjects.
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Table A.9: Estimates at the aggregate level (without morality)
1 type 2 types 3 types
Rep. agent Type 1 Type 2 Type 1 Type 2 Type 3
αk 0.03 −0.12 0.09 −0.16 −0.08 0.09
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.07) (0.02)
βk 0.15 0.27 −0.22 0.10 0.45 −0.21
(0.03) (0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08)
λk 0.26 0.28 0.15 0.30 0.23 0.15
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.05) (0.03) (0.01)
φk 1.00 0.64 0.36 0.36 0.29 0.36
(-) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05)
lnL -2425.2 -2244.4 -2217.1
EN (τ ) 0.00 4.96 17.55
ICL 4864.4 4526.6 4503.3
NEC - 0.027 0.084
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Based on our ‘core sample’ of 109 sub-
jects. For all types, we assume logarithmic utility (rk = 1).
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Table A.10: Estimates at the aggregate level (reciprocity)
1 type 2 types 3 types
Rep. agent Type 1 Type 2 Type 1 Type 2 Type 3
αk −0.08 −0.19 0.12 −0.13 0.12 −0.24
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.04)
βk 0.15 0.26 −0.23 0.45 −0.21 0.10
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05)
δk 0.16 0.28 −0.07 0.22 −0.07 0.32
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.14) (0.05) (0.08)
λk 0.25 0.26 0.15 0.22 0.15 0.28
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05)
φk 1.00 0.64 0.36 0.29 0.36 0.35
(-) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07)
lnL -2409.6 -2214.0 -2186.2
EN (τ ) 0.00 3.84 16.24
ICL 4838.0 4474.1 4454.3
NEC - 0.020 0.073
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Based on our ‘core sample’ of 109 sub-
jects. For all types, we assume logarithmic utility (rk = 1).
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Appendix A4 Experimental instructions
Welcome
Welcome to this experiment. All subjects receive the same instructions. Please read
them carefully.
Do not communicate with any of the other subjects during the entire experiment. If
you have any questions, raise your hand and wait until one of us comes to you to answer
your question in private.
During the experiment you will receive points. These points are worth money. How
many points (and hence how much money) you get depends on your own decisions, the
decisions of others, and chance. At the end of the experiment the points that you got will
be converted to euros and the amount will be paid to you privately, in cash.
Every point is equivalent to 0.17 euro.
Your decisions are anonymous. They will not be linked to your name in any way.
Other subjects can never trace your decisions back to you.
Today’s experiment consists of two parts. At the beginning of each part, you will re-
ceive new instructions. Your decisions made in one part will never affect outcomes in
another part, so you can treat both parts as independent.
Decision situations I
In this part, you will participate in 18 different decision situations. For each decision
situation, you will be randomly paired with someone else in the lab. Therefore, in each
decision situation you will (most likely) be paired with a different subject than in the
previous situation. You will never learn with whom you are paired.
The 18 decision situations will all be different, but they all involve two persons, and
in all the decision situations one person is assigned to Role A (person A) while the other
is assigned to Role B (person B). There are then two kinds of situations, as depicted in
Figures 1 (below) and Figure 2 (on the next page).
In the situation shown in Figure 1, person A first chooses LEFT or RIGHT. If A chooses
LEFT, person B has to choose between WEST or SOUTH. If person A chooses RIGHT,
person B has to choose between NORTH and EAST.
The choices of A and B jointly determine the number of points for A and B as follows:
• If A chooses LEFT and B chooses WEST, A gets WA points and B gets WB points
• If A chooses LEFT and B chooses SOUTH, A gets SA points and B gets SB points
53
• If A chooses RIGHT and B chooses NORTH, A gets NA points and B gets NB points
• If A chooses RIGHT and B chooses EAST, A gets EA points and B gets EB points
The values of WA, WB, SA, SB, NA, NB, EA and EB vary from one decision situation
to another. At the beginning of each decision situation, you and all others in the lab will
be informed of the values.
Decision situations II
In the decision situation shown in Figure 2, person A first chooses LEFT or RIGHT. If
A chooses LEFT, person B has no choice to make. If A chooses RIGHT, B has to choose
between NORTH and EAST.
The choices of A and B jointly determine the number of points for A and B as follows:
• If A chooses LEFT, A gets LA points and B gets LB points
• If A chooses RIGHT and B chooses NORTH, A gets NA points and B gets NB points
• If A chooses RIGHT and B chooses EAST, A gets EA points and B gets EB points
The values of LA, LB, NA, NB, EA and EB vary from one decision situation to another.




The figure below gives an example of a decision situation. This decision situation is
randomly selected. Remember that each of the 18 decision situations will be different.
In this example:
• If A chooses LEFT and B chooses WEST, A gets 80 points and B gets 20 points
• If A chooses LEFT and B chooses SOUTH, A gets 30 points and B gets 30 points
• If A chooses RIGHT and B chooses NORTH, A gets 75 points and B gets 75 points
• If A chooses RIGHT and B chooses EAST, A gets 20 points and B gets 80 points
If you want to see another example, click here
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Decisions and payments
You will see 18 different decision situations. For each decision situation, you will be
asked two things.
First, we will ask you what you want to do in Role A and what you want to do in Role
B.
Second, we will ask you to guess what the others in the lab will do in Role A and what
they will do in Role B. Specifically, we will ask you to guess:
• What percentage of the other people in the lab choose LEFT and what percentage
choose RIGHT when in Role A
• What percentage of the other people in the lab choose WEST and what percentage
choose SOUTH when facing that choice in Role B
• What percentage of the other people in the lab choose NORTH and what percentage
choose EAST when facing that choice in Role B.
Both your decisions and your guesses will determine how many euros you get at the
end of the experiment. Specifically, at the end of today’s experiment, two of the 18 deci-
sion situations will be randomly selected for payment: for one of these situations you
get points from the decisions, while for the other situation you get points from your
guesses. The same two decision situations will be selected for everyone in the lab. Your
decisions
For one decision situation you and the others in the lab get points from the decisions.
For this situation, either you or the person you are paired with is assigned to Role A,
while the other is assigned to Role B, with equal probability for each case. The number
of points you and this other person get is then determined by your decision in the role to
which you were assigned and the decision of the other person in the role to which (s)he
was assigned.
Note that it is equally likely that your choices in role A or role B count. Think about
flipping a coin: if heads comes up you will be in role A and if tails comes up you will be
in role B. When you make your decisions, you do not know which role you have and you
should therefore make decisions as if each role could determine the outcome, which is
the case. Your guesses
For another decision situation you and the others in the lab get points from the guesses.
You get more points the closer your guesses are to what the others actually choose in both
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roles A and B. One of the guesses that you make in this situation will be randomly selected
for payment. Specifically, you get between 0 and 50 points depending on the accuracy of
your guess. If you want to earn as much as possible with your guesses, you should sim-
ply answer with what you really think is the most likely answer to each question. Your
guesses do not have any impact on the number of points that the others in the lab get.
If you want to see how your earnings are calculated you can click here.
Decision screens
Below you can see and try the decision screens. First, you will see the screen where
you will be asked for a decision in a decision situation. If you make a decision, you will
be taken to the screen where you will be asked for a guess about what others will do.
In the examples below, all decision situations are chosen randomly. You can try the
decision screens as often as you want.
Show example
Quiz questions I
Please answer the following quiz questions. If you have any questions please raise your
hand.
The 18 decision situations:
O are always the same
O are sometimes the same
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O are always different
The figure shows a possible decision situation. The figure merely serves as an example,
the decision situation has been selected randomly.
Suppose A chooses LEFT and B chooses SOUTH and EAST. How much would A and B
earn?
A would earn: points B would earn: points
Suppose A chooses RIGHT and B chooses WEST and NORTH. How much would A and B
earn?
A would earn: points B would earn: points
Quiz questions II
Please answer the following quiz questions. If you have any questions please raise your
hand.
In each decision situation:
O you will have the same role (A or B)
O it is equally likely that you will be in role A or B
In each decision situation:
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O you will be paired with the same subject
O you will be paired with a randomly determined subject
The figure shows a possible decision situation. The figure merely serves as an example,
the decision situation has been selected randomly.
Suppose A chooses LEFT and B chooses NORTH. How much would A earn?
A would earn: points B would earn: points
Suppose A chooses RIGHT and B chooses EAST. How much would B earn?
A would earn: points B would earn: points
End of instructions
You have reached the end of the instructions. You can still go back by using the menu
above. If you are ready, click on ’continue’ below. If you need help, please raise your
hand.
As soon as everyone has finished with instructions the experiment will start. During
the experiment, you can take as much time as you need for each decision situation.
Part II
In this part you choose one of the six options listed below. You choose by clicking on
the option you prefer. Each option has two possible outcomes (Outcome A or Outcome
B) that are equally likely to occur. Think about the flip of a coin: heads (Outcome A) and
tails (Outcome B) are equally likely.
At the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly select Outcome A or Out-
come B. You will receive the number of points corresponding to the option you chose. For
example: If you choose option 4 you will receive 30 points if Outcome A is selected by
the computer and 9 points if Outcome B is selected by the computer.
59
